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ROUGH DRAIT - AUGUST 25, 1937 i 4 
'. 
';"s Address by Mr. C. A. Cobb, Director, Southern Division, Agr icu~tura l  
Adjustment Administ rat ion, a t  the Rice Branch Experiment 
Station, Stut tgar t ,  Arkariaas, on September 2, 1937 
I have seldom had the  opportunity t o  meet with a group so represen- 
t a t i v e  of the agricul ture  of an en t i r e  State. Representing, as it does, 
a l l  of the major agricul tural  enterprises of Arkanr~as, t h i s  get-together 
conference is an outstanding example of the gmwing recognition of the 
facO tha t  the principal problems of sgriculture are industry wide. 
There are,  of course, differences in the  technical knowledge which 
the r i c e  grower, the  cotton farmer, the potato producer, and t h e  grain farmer 
a ~ p l i e s  t o  h i s  production problems. But the  fundamental economic problems 
effecting the  prosperity of agriculture require the  united ef for t  of! a l l  
farmerso 
t It was t h e  recognition of t h i s  fact  that  brought about i n  1933, f o r  
the first time, a nation-wlde attack on the  f a r m  depression, 
Before the  w a r ,  the goals of agriculture were largely those which 
could be attained on individual fanne. After thewar,  fanners faced a new 
se t  of forces with which they could not deal individually. The increased 
use of improved machinery had increased the power t o  produce. Acreage ex- 
pansion, resul t ing from war-time demand, was followed l a t e r  by shrinkage 
of export outlets,  lower world prices, and lower domestic priceso 
It w a s  t h e  collapse of agricultural  prices i n  1932 tha t  brought the 
demand from every part  of the country for  a nation-wide farm program, and 
resulted i n  Congress passing the Agricultural Adjustment Acts Under the 
adjustment programs, Arkansas producers joined forces with t h e i r  fe l lan 
producers throughout t h e  Nation and s tar ted a sh i r t  away f m m  production of 
surplus crops. The agricul tural  conservation program emphasizes the s h i f t  
t o  g ras s  and lef~umes - - t o  be t te r  balanced farming, which improves the  l a d  
and conserves s o i l  resOUPCes. 
The method employed during the past four years i n  developing programs 
f o r  agriculture is significant f o r  two reasons: F i r s t ,  because it is  an 
outstanding example of economic democracy i n  action; and second, because 
fanners, f o r  the first time, have had a voice i n  the determination of national 
policies. When farmers i n  every c o m n i t y  i n  the United States  get together 
and discuss t h e i r  problems and make recommendations f o r t h e  solution of 
t h e i r  problems, you can be s u r e  of finding out what agriculture needa. When 
you base a national program on the  recommendations growing out of these 
discussions, you can be sure that  agriculture is get t ing what it wants* 
If agriculture is t o  re ta in  the  recognition which it must have f o r  
self-preservation i n  the determination of our national policies,  it must 
present a united ironto 
Through the agricul tural  conservation program, farmers are cooperat- 
ing on a nation-wide basis f o r  the purpose of improving the i r  income and 
t h e i r  s o i l  resources, upon which t h e i r  future depends. 
Today I wish that I might be able t o  s t a t e  what kind of national 
agricul tural  program rn w i l l  have i n  1938. But because of the necessity 
f o r  fur ther  study and discussion, I am unable t o  do this ,  but I can say that  
every ef for t  is  being made by the administration a t  Washington t o  deal ade- 
quately and appropriately with the f a m  problab  
The President , members of Congress, Secretary Wallace, a nd Adminis- 
t r a t o r  H. R. Tolley of the AgriculturalAdjus.taent Administration, with the 
advice and assistance of leaders of farm organizations, are makiw everg 
ef for t  t o  ascertain how the Federal Government can assist i n  aiding farmers 
i n  metting the serious problems which grew out of the World War maladjust- 
ments. I hope that  the way w i l l  be made olear  for  a sound and effect ive 
program which w i l l  enable firmere t o  cooperate once more in the solution of 
t h e ~ r - c ~ n  grobl- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
- - - - - - - - - 
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration has been one of the most 
s ignif icant  ins t i tu t ions  established i n  the history of American agriculture. 
It has been oapably administered. It has provided a means f o r  farmers t o  
work together i n  meeting the  problem of extremely low prices, and markets 
sharply reduced through the loss  of impoverished foreigh customers, high 
t a r i f f s ,  quota and other res t r ic t ions  to international trade. It has im 
proved the  purchasing power of farmers and improved the market fo r  the 
nation's industries through increasing the buying power of rural  people, 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Xe- canno~-f!orecasLwriA,k any- d e g r w  ~f -amtmncc- the  i a rnrp i~ tuw mi - - - - - - 
next year. For the time being, it i s  best t o  leave with the American people 
the  task of appraising the  accomplishments of the Adjustment Administration 
and other recovery measures i n  changing the agricul tural  picture from tha t  
which existed i n  Idarch, 1933. But we cannot ignore the f a c t  I&at cash 
income from f a n  rnarketings including Government payments t o  farmers 
w i l l  approximate $9,000,000,000 as compared t o  $4,328,000,000 i n  1932. 
I n  other words, during the  past four years much progress has been 
made toward the goal of be t te r  prices and incomes for  farmers. The si tuat ion 
has not yet improved t o  a point where it can be said tha t  farmers a r e  on -a - - - - - - -  
_ - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
basis  of economic equality with other groups* But it i s  nearer that  point 
than it has been fo r  years. 
I n  s p i t e  of t he  improvement i n  farm p r i c e s  and i n  farm income of 
t h e  c o t t o n  producers of t h e  South, t h e  farm p r i c e  of c o t t o n  i s  s t i l l  low 
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  average f o r  a l l  commodities. A t  a  guaranteed p r i c e  t h i s  
season of 12 c e n t s  per  pound t h e  cash  income from t h e  1937 c o t t o n  crop 
w i l l  appro xi mat^ ~~~1,1C~0~000,000.  A t  t h e  12 cen t s  a pound r a t e ,  however, 
c o t t o n  i s  s t i l l  only 73 percerrt o f  p-rity. 
Cotton more than any o t h e r  major a g r i c u l t u r a l  product of t h i s  
country i s  6ependsnt upon the  freedom o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e *  National- 
i s t i c  p o l i c i e s  v:hich s t i f l e  expor t  t r a d e  i n j u r e  c o t t o n  farmers* T m i f f s ,  
embargoes, l a c k  of c r e d i t ,  b a r t e r  agreements between f o r e i g n  na t ions ,  a l l  
a r e  p a r t l y ' t o  blame f o r  t he  increase  i c  f o r e i g n  consumption o f  fo re ign  
cot ton.  
But a f t e r  much unhappy experience i n  t h e  f i e l d  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d e  we have begun t o  change ou r  t a r i f f  system on t h e  b e s i s  of  t h e  T r ~ d e  
Reciproc i ty  & c t  of 1934, which empowers t h e  P re s iden t  t o  reduce t a r i f f  
r a t e s  up t o  50 percerrt i n  new t r a d e  agreements* I n  t h i s  new s p i r i t ,  agree- 
m e d s  have been made w i t h  a  number of  count r ies ,  and it oppeRrs t h a t  t h e y  
w i l l  l ead  t o  a gradual  r educ t ion  of od r  t a r i f f .  These t r a d e  agreenents  
m8.y be regarded a s  s i g n a l l i n g  a tu rn ing  p o i n t  not only i n  Pmerican t r a d e  
po l i cy  b u t  i n  genera l  world t r a d e  policy. Such chance would c o n s t i t u t e  
t h e  most dependable b a s i s  f o r  i nc reas ing  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m ~ e r c e  and r e s t o r -  
ing world markets f o r  America3 co t ton*  
The dec l ine  i n  our share of world t r a d e  i n  c o t t o n  has o f t e n  been 
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  Agriculture.1 Adjustment Program. The b a s i s  f o r  the  ex- 
pansion i n  f o r e i g n  product ion of c o t t o n  was l a i d  long before  t he  adoption 
of t h e  adjustment programs i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  This i s  c l e a r l y  i nd ica t ed  
i n  a n  examination of f o r e i g n  c o t t o n  product ion s t a t i s t i c s  back t o  1890. 
The expansion i n  fo re ign  product ion o f  c o t t o n  cannot be explained merely 
by r e f e rence  t o  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  adjustment  prograxs. I t  i s  necessary  t o  
examine t h e  p r i c e  of cof fee  i n  E r a z i l ,  t h e  p r i  ce  of wheat i n  t he  Argent ire  , 
t h e  p r i c e  of g r a i n s  and o the r  products i n  Cgypt and India ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i -  
z a t i o n  progrem of riussia, and a number o f  o ther  f a c t a s  growing out  of t h e  
7-orld Tar and out  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  of d i f f e r e n t  c o u ~ l t r i e s  i n  t h e  
decade o r  a o r e  before t h e  advent of t h e  Agr i cu l tu ra l  kdjustment Adninis tra-  
t i o n .  
It i s  s o m e t i ~ e s  argued t h a t  t h e  acldjstment progrpm i n  t h i s  country 
brought  t h e  p r i c e  of American co t ton  on t h e  world market out of l i n e  vrith 
t h e  p r i c e  of f o r e i g n  cotton, and -that t h i s  militated a g a i n s t  the consumption 
of Jmerican cot ton.  You may be i n t e r e s t e d  t o  know t h a t  i n  t he  seasons 
1927-28 and 1928-29s t h e  p r i c e  a t  Liverpool of Ind ian  cot ton,  which i s  by 
f a r  t h e  outs tanding  competi tor  of Americsn cot ton,  avera;;e approximately 
79.7 percent  of t h e  p r i c e  of American cot ton.  I n  those  pre-depression 
seasons, f o r e i g n  consumljion of American c o t t o n  average5 about  8-112 m i l l i o n  
b a l e s  o r  approximately 46 percent  of a l l  co t ton  consumed i n  f o r e i ~ n  count r ies .  
In  t h e  1935-36 season, t h e  p r i ce  of Indian  c o t t o n  w s s  approximately 79.5 
percent  of American cot ton,  b u t  t h e  consumption of American c o t t o n  was only  
32 percent  of t h e  consumption of a l l  co t ton  i n  fo re ign  c o u r t r i e s *  During 
t h e  1936-37 season, t h e  p r i c e  o f  Indian c o t t o n  v~ms 79.4 percent of t h e  
p r i c e  of American c o t t o n  h u t  t h e  consumption of  Pmerican c o t t o n  abroad w8.s 
only about  24 percent  of t h e  t o t a l  c o t t o n  consumed i n  fore igncount r ies .  
I n  o the r  words, wi th  t h e  p r i c e  of American c o t t o n  i n  1935-36 and 1936-37 
r e s t o r e d  t o  i t s  usua l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t he  p r i c e  of f o r e i p  cot ton,  the 
percentage of American c o t t o n  consumed abroad i s  f a r  below pre-depression 
l e v e l s .  Apparently, t h e  reocon i s  not thf i t  t h e  p r i c e  of American c o t t o n  
i s  out of l i n e  w i t h  the p r i c e  of Indian  cot ton.  Furthermore, it should 
be remembered t h r t  t h e  carryover  o f  h e r i c e n  c o t t o n  i s  s t i l l  l a r g e r  t h a n  
averaye, a.n4 t h a t  American co t ton  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  world a t  prices. 
A very inpor t an t  f a c t o r  i n  t he  r ecen t  expansion i n  f o r e i g n  c o t t o n  
product ion ~ h i c h  e.s g e n e r a l l y  been overlooked i s  t he  inc rease  i n  y i e l d  
per  acre .  About 45 percent  o f  t h e  increase  i n  f o r e i g n  c o t t o n  prod-uction 
s i n c e  1931 i s  due t o  a yenera1 inorcase  i n  y i e l d ,  and t h i s ,  of course,  
was not  t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  adjustment  progrm.  
Turning t o  the s i tua. t ion i n  which t h e  r i c e  grower f i n d s  h i n s e l f  
today, we  f in2  t h a t  t h e  1937 southern  r i c e  crop from present  i n d i c a t i o n s  
w i l l  no t  b e  much l a r g e r  than the  q a n t i t y  t h a t  Kas f i n a l l y  accounted f o r  
from l a s t  season ' s  production. fPills,  however, c a r r i e d  over about a m i l l i o n  
b a r r e l s  o r  pockets more o ld  r i c e  t h a n  l a s t  season, s o  t h a t  t h e  sou the rn  r i c e  
i ndus t ry  i s  faced w i t h  t h e  problem of f i n d i n g  a market f o r  about  20 percent  
more r i c e  t han  it was a b l e  t o  s e l l  during t h e  1936-37 season o r  c a r r y  over 
s burdensome supply a t  the  c l o s e  of the  season  next  July.  
Narket prospec ts  f o r  t h e  cu r r en t  season a r e  s t i l l  uncertain.  Domestic 
u t i l i z a t i o n  should equal  o r  s l i z h t l y  exceed t h a t  of 19?6-?7 w i t h  continued 
in~rovement,  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  and economtc condikions. Puerto Bico can be 
counted upon t o  take about  t he  u s u a l  quan t i t y  of southern r i c e  but  t h e r e  
i s  af; p re sen t  l i t t l e  p r o s p c t  f o r  any i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  ecport t rade ,  except  
t o  Cuba* A r e c e n t  r educ t ion  i n  t h e  Cuban t a r i f f  on American r i c e  g ives  
United S t a t e s  r i c e  a decicle4 a d v a r t a ~ e  over t h a t  of o t h e r  fo re ign  count r ies ,  
'out sou the rn  m i l l s  a r e  faced w i t h  a c t i v e  compet i t ion  from Ca l i fo rn i a  where 
a l a r g e  carry-over supplemented by a record c rop  i s  now i n  prospect.  
A t  the beginning of the 1936-37 season supplies 09 southern rough 
r i c e  outside the n i l l s  were estims.ted a t  a,wroxims.tely 10,500,090 barrels.  
Tecei3t.s by mil ls  d- ring the sezson, however, indicate thnt the estimate 
of production w a s  sroimd 665,000 barrels  below f i n a l  outturns, with the re- 
s u l t  tha t  su>plies nctuallg tota led  bout 11,165,030 barrels.  Deducting 
around 700,000 b ~ r r e l q  f o r  seed requirements, feed, and use of hu l l e r  m i l l s ,  
l e f t  about 10,465,000 bqrrels  f o r  c o m ~ c ? r c i ~ l  ..iills. I f i l l  receipts fii-ring 
the year ended July 31 totaled a, l i t t l e  over 10,275,000 b ~ r r e l a  i7ht3.r exports 
amounted to about 30,000 barrels ,  lenvinz s l i gh t ly  l e s s  than 160,COO bar re l s  
on f a r m s  and i n  country warehouses ?t the close o f  the segson. 
r i c e  
Pro&uction of milled,increased proportionnllp with the croF but 
shipments from mil l s ,  while ?&out 1,2?5,009 p c k e t s  more than during the 
1936-37 Repson, were about 800,000 pockets mder the output with the resu l t  
ths t  stodcs of milled r i ce  a t  m i l l s  at the close of t h ~  sesson amounted t o  
nenrly 1,072,000 ~ o c k e t s  o r  approximetely 809,300 pockets l s rger  t h m  a 
yarr ear l ie r .  Kills hed 125,00r? ba1-rels of rough r i c e  on hcnd a t  the close 
of the senson than a year e a r l i e r  so  thnt t o t a l  sunplies of southern r i c e  
st the end of 1936-37 sensqn r e r e  anproximately l,CI'?O,OC)O barrels  or noclcets 
l a rger  than at the close of July, 1936. 
-4 1937 crop of 11,207,OC)O barrels  wrs i n  prospect at the f i r s t  of 
August, according to  estimates by t h ~  Bureau of Agricultural Economics. 
Adding the carry-over of 933 -rice i n  cm.ntry nraral~ouses cn? on farms would 
give a prospective t o t c 4  sup91:. o f  11,365,0'3'7 bmre ls .  I f  around 700,000 
bar re l s  a re  required fo r  seed, feed, and use of hullermills ,  there wou3.d 
remain f o r  commercial mil ls  a t o t a l  of about 10,665,000 bzrrels. This would 
be nearly 1,000,000 barrels  .lore than southern mil ls  were able to  dispose 
of during th9 1936-37 season and when sdded to  the stocks tfiat mil ls  had 
on hand a t  the beginning of the current secscn would nezrly double the cumu- 
-R = 
ILt ion of the S ~ ~ S Q D  just  closed. 
llerlcet y o s p e c t ~  f o r  the 1937-33 sepson a re  s t i l l  ra ther  uncertpin. 
D ~ t a  not pet available to  show tho  dis t r ibut ion of the 1976-37 suy>lies 
t o  the domestic trsdc,  'naulsr possessions, and into e v o r t  chsnns! s. -4s 
s ta ted  above, however, shipnents of mill-ed r i ce  from m i l l s  August, 1936 
th- ugh July,  1937 totnled 9,?85,3r)0 pockets compared vtth 8,557,000 p o c b t s  
fo r  the previous season. Incop le t e  s t a t i s t i c s ,  hvrever,  would i n d i c ~ t e  thpt 
emor t s  of southern r i c e  tote led around 500,Oqr) nockets and shipments to  
i n su l s r  possessions prcund 2,QOn,000 wockets, lerving anproxim~tely 7,259,000 
pockets f o r  domestic use. With continued improvement i n  economic conditions 
i t  would 8,yyea.r probable tha t  domestic uti_lizr.tion monld be naintcined o r  
possibly s l i gh t ly  increased during the current season, I t  seems p r o h ~ h l e  
clso that  abo~xt t3e same q u a ~ t i ~ y  as last, seeson .nqr be s h i ~ ~ e d  to  h e r t o  
Pic0 ?nd other insular  poss~ss ions ,  F q o r t  trade with f i roye does not shqm 
my signs of iaproveaent but the recent reduction i n  the h b ~ n  t ~ r i f f  to  the 
equivelent of 428 per 100 w i l l  no doubt resu l t  i n  lnrger e ~ o r t s  t o  that  
Island, D'-~rir,g the celenda- yeRr 1936 Cubm inyorts from all countries 
tote led a~proximately 4,331,Mn ?ocl:ets. During the f i r q t  s i x  months of 
1937 Cub'w. imports totnled 2,401,OOrI pockets', of which 224,000 were f roa  
the United Stntes, !Tnile -4mericm r i c e  w i l l  h ~ v e  ?n rdvnnt~ge of $1.67 
yer LO9 i n  C u b ~  t e r i f f  ra tes  u n t i l  Decenber 31, 1937, southern r i ce  w i l l  
s t i l l  meet conslderrble cocpetition from Ezst Indian r i ce  and from California 
shipments. A t  the :niddle of h u ~ p s t  5 Star S i r m  r ice  vas nffered a t  $2.87: 
c , j , f .  HRbana which, r7i th  thc dilty, would mrks thic  r i ce  cost r?%olesnle 
about $4.95-%. On the sqme date southern long grains lp;ere 3~1-chased ~ ; _ t  $4.3.0 
c.i.f. Ha,banp, which woilld nnke t h i s  r i ce  cost Cubr?n I?~.lgnrs $4.52, duty p i d .  
A t  the snme time, ~ O W P V F ~ ~ ,  7 ?a l i fo rn i a -~Tap~  aas offered f ree ly  ?.t $2.50 c, i .f ,  
Habana and over lC?,r)or) bpgs of C.-lifomia-Jynn .acre sold to  Cubm bqvers 
dl~r ine  the seconc week i n  Auglst .  
-9- 
The low pr ice  quoted on S?.lifornin r i c e  re f lec t s  the e f fo r t s  of the 
California r i c e  industry t o  d i ~ o s e  of t h i s  seoson'r; large s u ~ n l i e s  before 
the new crop becomes ntrpilable. ?!he 1936 Californir crop mr,s the la rges t  
on record u? to  that  time ,and totaled a~proximately 4,297,039 bggs (100 
pounds ppch). Awst 1 conditions, however, indicated n crop of neerly 
4,574,000 bags t h i s  swson, or about 275,QOCl b?gs more than last y e p r ' s  
$ 
large out turn, A t  the f i r s t  of August s t cdr s  of rough r"nd n i l l ed  r i ce  i n  
California were eq i~ ivden t  to  1,337,000 bags of rough r i ce  cornpared with 
761,OQO bags a year ea r l i e r ,  C ~ l i f o r n i s  mil ls  hsve adopted 3 ?rogr?rn f o r  
the d i c p ~ s a l  of su-lus stocks through EL subsidy on exnorts and the grinding 
of l ~ r g e  q u m t i t i a s  into brewers rice.  The h i& p i c e  of corn broadened 
the market materially f o r  brewers r i c e  during the ?ast  sepson and C ~ l i f o r n i a  
mil ls  have produced a r o ~ ~ n d  600,090 bags of brewers r i c e  t h i s  scrson conpared 
with about 190,000 l ~ s t  year, Asalreaciy stated,  the Califnrnia mil ls  h ~ v e  
sold California-.Tcpnn to  the & ~ b m  trade at $2.50 per 100 c.i.f. Habsna. 
Several thousand b~e;s  h ~ v e  recently been 301d to  Argentina and n sa le  of 
1,500 bnes was donfirmed l a s t  week to  Eolivia f o r  August shipment st $2.10 
per 100, double seclced, delivered Sm Francisco. Under a snecial  agreement 
with the growers these foreign orders must be f i l l e d  with r i c e  milled from 
stocks owned bv pronsrs under a t o l l  2 i l l in r :  arrmgement with probable 
returns to growers estimated ;tt $1.15-1.25 psr 100 f o r  ITo. 1 Paddy, Thig 
would be ecpivdent  t o  $1.85-2.0$? per  bnrrel. 
Increased sun-plies of southern rice f o r  the 1936-37 sePson mere 
reflected i n  lower prices. Extra f m c y  R1ne Xose i n  the Pew Orleans market 
averaged approximately 35# per 100 lower during the 1936-37 season comnnred 
with 1935-36 notwithstcanding ths t  Shc ?r ice  l n n e l  of other farm products 
percent 
was up 5/ rnd of a l l  comodities rbout 8 nerrent mrer the p? e v i o u ~  :.err. 
I n  s p i t e  of t h e  e f f o r t s  t h a t  have been mede t o  confuse t h e  
i s sues  and ge t  farmers t o  give up the  odvcntages they  he.ve gained, 
I am convinced t h a t  f a m e r s  have z c l e a r  understanding of t h e  i s s u e s  
involved i n  t h e  so lu t ion  of t 3 e i r  problems. They knov t h o t  t h e  
process of rebui ld ing  0u.r f ~ r e i g n  markets nus t  con t inue - - th~ t  i n  
order  t o  s e l l  vje must be ~ L l l i n g  t o  buy. They know t h a t  t h e  in -  
c rease  i n  consumer purchasing povrer must continue and t h c t  continued 
reexplop-ent  of  t h e i r  c i t y  customers and business a c t i v i t y   ill be 
stimu1,nted by exp~~nded  w r l d  t rede .  They kno~: t h a t  business cnnnot 
nrosqer 2nd provide emylopent f o r  c i t y  workers vrhen farm income i s  
!IT! f its r~-esc-:'; leve l .  They k n w  t h e y  cnnnot s e l l  t h e  products of 
1932 y o d u c t i o n  l e v e l s  ~t a p r o f i t  \!-hen fore ign  ne t ions  r e fuse  t o  
buy our products ir. the  yosld market and mi l l ions  of unemployed 
csnnot buy them i n  t h e  domestic market. Farmers knov: they must be 
r e l i eved  f r o n  t h e  f inencia1  pressure v,hich drove them t o  overcroppine; 
and overproduction i n  8.n e f f o r t  t o  compensate f o r  l o v ~  prices.  They 
know the% t h e i r  f u t u r e  depends upon sound fr.rning sjhich v & l l  conserve 
t h e i r  s o i l  resources and upon p r i ces  t h ~ t  ~$11 give them R fe.ir share 
of t h e  ns t ione l  income. 
Be t t e r  balance i n  ag r i cu l tu re  and b e t t e r  b a l m c e  between 
a g r i c u l t u r e  and i ndus t ry  ~611 solve our most d i f f i c u l t  farm problems. 
I n  order  t o  secure and maintoin t h i s  ba lmce ,  farmers throughout t h e  
country must v:ork together .  They must heve a c l e w  understanding 
of  t h e  problems of o the r  farmers and t h e  problem of agricultv.re a s  a 
whole. I should se.y t h r t  you have gone a long vrzy here i n  Ytrkansos 
tovrard the  develop-ent of agr icu l tu ra l  unity, v,%thin your 
ov.m State. Likewise there  i s  need fo r  agr icul ture  t o  
develop t he  some kind of united f ront  i n  t h e  n ~ ~ t i o n  as a 
whole. I know t h a t  Lrkansas fanners p i l l  play t h e i r  p a r t  
i n  helping t o  achieve t h i s  natiom.1 agr icu l tu ra l  unj.ty. 
